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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I raise the question of whether psychological citizenship (i.e. the subjective sense of
being a citizen) is necessarily intertwined with a sense of national identity in our contemporary world.
First, I argue that psychological citizenship is always dependent upon a sense of shared identity with
the community (be it national or other), and I explore some of the reasons why this is the case.
Second, I argue that such sense of shared identity can nevertheless sometimes remain implicit so that
in order to assess its impact one may need to look beyond people’s explicit statements of
identiﬁcation. Third, I turn to the more speciﬁc question of national identity and argue that such
identity presents particular characteristics that make it consonant with the notion of citizenship (and
thus able to sustain a subjective sense of citizenship) in ways that other identities might not always be.
Finally, I compare a psychological citizenship based on national identity to onewhich would be based
on a ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identity. I argue that, whilst the former constitutes a pervasive social
psychological reality, doubts can be raised as to whether this is the case for the latter, and thus as to
whether it can form a credible alternative to national identity as the psychological substrate of
citizenship. I conclude with some reﬂections concerning what different approaches of social
psychology can bring to the study of the psychological aspects of citizenship. Copyright # 2011
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
Citizenship and nationality: Nowadays, these terms are virtually interchangeable, at least if
considered at the legal and administrative level. To be a citizen is to be a citizen of a speciﬁc
country. Even the shaky concept of European citizenship is no real exception, for such
citizenship can only be gained through being a citizen of one of the member-states in the
ﬁrst place.
Nonetheless, the concept of citizenship is not merely legal but also encompasses
political and psychological dimensions—as does, of course, the idea of nationality. One
could therefore ask how much citizenship and nationality are intertwined at these levels.
In particular, the question which will be addressed in this paper is to what extent a
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psychological sense of citizenship relies and depends upon the existence of a sense of
national identity.
The importance of this question arises from the fact that some scholars (e.g. Baubock,
1994; Habermas, 1998; Parekh, 2003) have argued for the necessity of going beyond the
nationality-based model of citizenship. Needless to say, this is a debate with crucial
political implications given that it concerns the future of citizenship and its institutions.
Yet, the credibility of alternative institutional models of citizenship does not merely depend
on their legal or social or political merits (which will not be discussed here), but also on
whether they can be grounded in the social psychological reality of how people experience
their citizenship. In that context, the extent to which, in our contemporary world,
psychological citizenship is necessarily bounded with a sense of national identity or can be
anchored into other forms of identiﬁcation, and whether there are indications that this is
changing or likely to change, should therefore constitute key aspects of the debate.
PSYCHOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTITY
To try and bring some light on these questions, one could start by asking whether and why
psychological citizenship should require a sense of identity at all. At a basic level, one can
deﬁne psychological citizenship as the subjective sense of being a citizen. That is, it implies
seeing one’s status of citizen as more than a mere external and objective ascription and thus
to subjectively care about such status and what it entails in terms of rights, beneﬁts and
responsibilities. Yet, it is often assumed that such subjective citizenship also goes with a
sense of identity. For instance, Kostakopoulou (2008) deﬁnes citizenship as ‘equal
membership of a political community from which enforceable rights and obligations,
beneﬁts and resources, participatory practices and a sense of identity ﬂow’ (p. 1). Such
deﬁnitions, then, take identity as a necessary correlate of (psychological) citizenship. But
why exactly should it be so?
Conceptually speaking, one could point out that, if citizenship is a status accorded in
virtue of belonging to a speciﬁc political community, then it follows that people need to see
such community as actually corresponding to their community if their objective status of
citizen is to have any psychological resonance. That is, it implies the feeling that the scope
of the institutions of citizenship corresponds to one’s community, and that one is a
legitimate member of that community (i.e. the community is part of one’s self-deﬁnition),
and entitled to the status of citizen and its associated rights and beneﬁts (as well as bounded
by its associated responsibilities) for that very reason. Similarly, as one cannot feel like (or
indeed be) a citizen in isolation, psychological citizenship also implies seeing others as
fellow citizens. That is, it presupposes the perception that I and others are part of the same
community (however, it is deﬁned), sharing the same political horizon—and thereby
entitled to the same citizenship status, associated rights etc.—as opposed to being an
arbitrary aggregate of people belonging to different communities and towhat are (or should
be) essentially separate polities.
To this conceptual argument, one could add that, without such a common sense of
identity, it also becomes difﬁcult to understand (amongst other things) how the reciprocity
expected among fellow citizens can be made legitimate and even normative. As Reicher
and Haslam (2009) point out, in the context of helping behaviour, whilst the question
‘will we help others?’ may be a relevant one, the question ‘will we help ourselves?’ is a
no-brainer. Similarly, a sense that we are all part of the same community provides the
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conditions under which the act of recognizing others as citizens with the same rights and
duties as oneself, and with whom we are in a relation of reciprocity, is not only legitimate
but a simple matter of taken-for-granted common sense—as opposed to a more volatile act
of altruism or a calculated exchange of ‘courtesy’.
What is more, the scope of the reciprocity created by the sharing of a common identity is
arguably not limited to the acknowledgement of each others’ rights. For instance, in a
speech given in 2008 and dedicated to the importance of identity in politics, the UK
Minister of State Michael Wills argued that identity is at play in something as material as
the tax system: ‘. . .the redistribution that is inherent in the tax system is only sustainable
within the framework of a politics founded on a shared identity and community of interest,
where citizens are committed to reciprocal rights and responsibilities.’ (2008, p. 1). Indeed,
if it were not for the often taken-for-granted assumption that we are part of the same group,
it would be difﬁcult to legitimize the very idea of redistribution of wealth and any sort of
distributive justice (Habermas, 1998; Miller, 1995, 2000), or for that matter any political
decision in which some stand to lose out for the sake of others and/or in the name of the
general interest (Barry, 1991). This is because the people on the losing end of these
decisions would have no reason to accept them as legitimate and democratic if they do not
see losers and winners as part of the same ‘we’ (Marks, 1999). In other words, a common
identity is what makes possible to talk about ‘our’ common interest as a group in the ﬁrst
place. Accordingly, it is also what legitimates the idea of majority rule at the heart of
modern democracy (Scharpf, 1996) as it deﬁnes the majority as ‘our’ majority. Thus, if
identity deﬁnes the political community as being ‘ours’, it is also what deﬁnes this
community as the particular demographic scope within which democratic politics and
citizenship can operate legitimately (Calhoun, 1995)1.
A PSYCHOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT IDENTITY?
Nevertheless, the argument of a necessary relationship between psychological citizenship
and identity has to face one potential criticism. Indeed, one difﬁculty is that such
relationship can sometimes be explicitly rejected by citizens themselves. For instance, in
their study on national identities in Britain, Abell, Condor, and Stevenson (2006) note that
many people in England and Scotland ‘avoid social identity constructions of nationality,
citizenship, or civil society’. In Scotland, people who support the Union in Britain often
‘distinguish their political commitment to British citizenship from questions relating to
their subjective identity’, whilst in England, many tend to avoid any ‘allusions to a
common or distinctive identity or character on the part of the citizenry’ (p. 207).
However, in both cases, it could be argued that what these respondents reject is a
particular idea of identity (in the sense of commonalities between people), which does not
prevent identity (as the sense of being part of a community) to operate, even if this might be
1Space limitations prevent me to discuss here many other arguments (as well as their respective merits and/or
weaknesses) that have been put forward in terms of grounding the necessity of identity for citizenship and the good
functioning of a political community. This includes, for instance, the fact that identity provides a framework that
makes sense of the social world (Taylor, 1994), the stability necessary to make meaningful decisions (Kymlicka,
1995), and a sense of continuity with the past as well as a vision for the future (Tamir, 1993). Note, however, that
althoughmost of these arguments have been made in the context of national identity, their logic could very well be
extended to other types of identities. This is why so far my point is only made in terms of identity in general and as
regards the sense of forming a community, be it national or other. The question of the speciﬁcity of national
identity is addressed later on.
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in implicit ways. Indeed, what Abell et al.’s research shows is that both English and
Scottish respondents who resist the language of ‘British identity’ do so insofar as they take
it to mean that people across Britain are alike. For those English who espouse liberal
individualist values, such understanding of ‘identity’ goes against their ideal of pluralism
and diversity, and they tend to associate any display of national identity with intolerance
and xenophobia (Condor, 1996, 2000). As for the Scots, the idea that people in England and
Scotland would be alike clearly clashes with their sense of Scottish speciﬁcity. But Abell
et al.’s point is precisely that both English and (non-separatist) Scots use spatial references
instead—the idea of that ‘We are an Island’, that we are the ‘British Isles’—to maintain
the idea of Britain as a real and distinct political community of which they are a part.
Thus, to focus on the case of Abell and colleagues’ Scottish respondents, whilst they
may resist the idea of ‘feeling British’, they nevertheless justify their political commitment
to Britain on the basis that they live in Britain and that this ‘objective’ fact must be
acknowledged (e.g. ‘you’ve got to accept it, the island of Britain/Yes, we’re British’, p.
213). This also means that they construe the interests and fate of the Scots and the English
as inescapably intertwined, given that they share the same geographical space (e.g. ‘there’s
a lot of issues that it is the whole of the British isles, because we aren’t a separate island.
We are still one country’, p. 215; one can note here the use of the ‘we’ as well as the
description of Britain as ‘one country’).
In other words, whilst these respondents may treat their ‘Britishness’ as a purely
objective fact, separate from all questions of subjective identity, their statements
nevertheless carry speciﬁc (and potentially contestable) assumptions as to the existence of
a British community as well as to Scotland’s inclusion within that community. That such
assumptions are hardly neutral becomes even more apparent if we contrast such statements
with those made by Scottish separatists. Compare the above, for example, with the
following extract taken from an interview with a candidate for the Scottish National Party
(Sindic, 2010).
...when anyone asks me about Britishness, I say, I never have been British, I am not British, and
never will be British, I am a Scot. I see myself ﬁrst as Scottish, and then as part of Europe. Scotland
is a nation within Europe. So I am Scottish, I’m European, I’m not British. There’s no such thing
as a British person. They’re English, Irish, Scottish or Welsh. . . And being said, well, you know,
you live in Britain, or the British Isles, I say, well, so is the republic of Ireland, but I very much
doubt they’d thank you for calling them British.
Here, it is more than the subjective notion of ‘feeling British’ which is rejected, as this
respondent states quite categorically ‘I am not British’, as a matter of fact—and, what is
more, a fact which is valid not only at a personal level but for all Scots (and English and
Welsh and Irish people), as ‘there’s no such thing as a British person’. Indeed she explicitly
addresses the idea that being British is an ‘objective’ fact to be acknowledged, on the basis
that Scots live within the ‘British Isles’, by putting into question the very notion of the
‘British Isles’ as a merely ‘factual’ way to designate space—and thus ‘British people’ as
the merely ‘objective’ way to designate the people living within that space. She does this
through a reductio ad absurdum, using the Irish example to push the logic of the appellation
until its inadequacy is exposed (as it would include people who are ‘objectively’ not part of
Britain). If Scotland is to be part of a wider geographical area, then the signiﬁcant space
within which it is situated is Europe and not Britain (‘Scotland is a nation within Europe’).
In sum, what this contrast illustrates is how representations of place can be shaped by
various political understandings and articulate with different representations of identity
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(e.g. Hooson, 1994). Accordingly, far from being a purely neutral and objective matter,
geography and territory as ways to deﬁne who forms a community (and/or who does not)
can be as much open to political argument (e.g. what area constitutes a single territory,
part of a territory or several distinct territories) as culture or national character (Reicher
& Hopkins, 2001).
More generally, the use of geographical imagery is but one example of how the feeling of
forming a community does not have to rely on representations of people as similar (Condor,
2006; Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010). Most importantly for our
present purpose, it thereby illustrates how taken-for-granted assumptions about identity
and community can be at play even where people reject any form of common character or
culture and/or explicitly deny any strong emotional attachment to their ‘objective’
community. Certainly, one should be careful to distinguish between external category
ascription and the subjective importance of that category for social actors (e.g. see Fenton,
2007). Nevertheless, it is also true that such subjective importance may remain implicit to
the actors themselves in their daily life (Billig, 1995)—until their identity is challenged,
denied or put within an unfamiliar context where it cannot be taken for granted anymore.
To take a simple example, people may well reject all notion of national pride or patriotism
and yet feel like they are leaving ‘home’ when moving abroad as opposed to moving
to another city of ‘their’ country (Hopkins, Reicher, & Harrison, 2006; Reicher, Hopkins,
& Harrison, 2006).
PSYCHOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
Psychological citizenship may require identiﬁcation with the community, but none of the
reasons given above require per se that that identiﬁcation should be with the national
community. To answer the question raised at the beginning, one should therefore now ask
whether or not psychological citizenship necessarily relies on a sense of identity that is
speciﬁcally national.
Of course, at one level, the answer to this question clearly has to be negative, given the
historical contingency of the relationship between nationality and citizenship. Since the
notion of citizenship existed well before the advent of the nation-state (e.g. Hobsbawm,
1990), its subjective dimension must therefore have relied on other forms of identiﬁcations
at other points in time and in different political contexts. It would be thus be absurd to reify
this relationship as a natural necessity.
Bearing this fact in mind, one could nevertheless raise the question of whether there is
anything speciﬁc about national identity that would make it consonant with the notion of
citizenship—and therefore a suitable basis for psychological citizenship—in ways that
other contemporary identities might not always be. In that respect, if we follow Anderson
(1991) and argue that the speciﬁcity of the nation resides in the particular style in which the
national community is imagined (an issue highly relevant to the social psychology of
nationhood), the question becomes how much the particular traits of the national
imagination are compatible or not with the style in which a ‘community of citizens’ is
imagined.
More speciﬁcally, Anderson argues that one aspect of the national imagination is that
‘regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship’ (p.7). That is, not only is there no
inherent hierarchy amongst the members of a nation, but national membership is supposed
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to actively ‘bracket’ any hierarchical differences (of social status, class, profession, wealth,
etc.) that might otherwise exist. Likewise, since its birth with the Greek polis, citizenship
has always fulﬁlled a similar ‘equalising’ role. For the ancient Greeks, its function was to
establish equality de jure amongst those who were called upon to take part in political life,
precisely because an inequality de facto reigned amongst them. Such ‘levelling’ was
deemed necessary because true democratic politics—as opposed to tyranny—could only
take place between ‘equals’ (Arendt, 1958). Today, modern citizenship is still aimed at
guaranteeing equalities of rights (and duties) whatever inequalities might otherwise exist
(e.g. Marshall, 1950; see also the deﬁnition of citizenship as equal membership quoted at
the beginning).
In fact, one may argue that a nationality-based conception of citizenship goes further
than its Greek ancestor in terms of its ‘equalising’ effect. Indeed, citizens of the Greek city-
state imagined themselves to be different from and superior to barbarians, precisely insofar
as they were citizens, and thus had a true political life, within which political business was
resolved through speech and concerted action—whereas barbarians, like animals, only
knew the law of the mightiest (Arendt, 1958). By contrast, for the national citizens of
today, imagining the national community is imagining it within a world of similar national
communities (Billig, 1995). De facto inequality may of course exist between those
nations (in terms of power, status, etc.), like it does amongst citizens, but the imagined
world of nations is one where all nations, be they small or large, powerful or
inconsequential, are de jure equal political actors, and where all, in principle, are entitled to
the same rights (from sovereignty in internal affairs, to having its own Olympic team) and
duties.
The modern, nationality-based, concept of citizenship is therefore also arguably more
inclusive than its ancestor, insofar as it possesses a more universal scope. This is not
because nowadays women are counted as full citizens or because slaves have dis-
appeared—both of those classic exclusions of the Greek polis also took place at some point
in the age of nations. Rather, it is because, in the imagined world of nations, the whole of
humanity is seen as divided into nations, so that all (even foreigners) are supposed to have a
nationality and thus to be citizens of some place, instead of some being citizens and other
‘barbarians’ (although this of course leaves the thorny issue of the potential political
exclusion of residents in foreign countries).
To be sure, whilst the above characteristics may be speciﬁc to national identity, they may
not be exclusively so. One could therefore reiterate the argument that national identity may
not be the only type of identity potentially consonant with the notion of citizenship. The
point, however, is that there are certainly some types of identities which are not so
accommodating. To take just one case in point, it would be difﬁcult, for instance, to
imagine a concept of (equalizing) citizenship compatible with the (inherently hierarchical)
caste system in India (Dumont, 1971).
Furthermore, besides this issue of ‘compatibility’, and as pointed out at the beginning,
the question of the ‘necessity’ of national identity for psychological citizenship is
also whether, empirically speaking, national identity is indeed the basis for most
people’s identiﬁcation with their citizenship community in our contemporary world, or
whether such identiﬁcation might ﬁnd its sources elsewhere—as well as whether or
not there is good reason to believe that this is likely to change in the foreseeable
future. This question is touched upon in the next section, through a comparison
with one of the possible alternatives to a psychological citizenship based on national
identity.
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A PSYCHOLOGICAL CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT NATIONAL IDENTITY?
If national identity might not be unique in terms of being potentially able to
psychologically sustain the idea of a community of citizens, then one could also address
the question of its necessity by turning it around and asking what, if any, are its plausible
alternatives. In particular, the most notable alternative to a nationality-based conception
of citizenship lies with the concept of global citizenship (e.g. Baubock, 1994; Giddens,
1990; Habermas, 1994; Parekh, 2003). Psychologically speaking, such a conception of
citizenship relies on the idea that people may (and should) see themselves as citizens on the
basis of a ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identity, i.e. to see themselves as ‘citizens of the
world’. Like national identity, the idea of a global identity has the advantage of being
potentially consonant with the notion of citizenship, insofar as it also constitutes (at least in
theory) an essentially equalizing form of identiﬁcation. Moreover, for the proponents of
global citizenship, the main merit of such form of identiﬁcation resides in the fact that it
would overcome the inherent exclusiveness of national identity—as the latter is always
both exclusive and inclusive in nature.
As it stands, there is of course little or no legal, political or institutional basis for the
notion of global citizenship (Lagos, 2002). The closest thing that could be seen as
providing such framework is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; however, the
possible enforcement of those rights is still very much the matter of national states.
Nevertheless, the argument that it constitutes a realistic alternative to a nationality-based
citizenship is based on the claim that a ‘global’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ identity corresponds to a
growing social psychological reality. That is, it is argued that globalization has induced
(and, increasingly, continues to do so) changes in everyday practices which have affected
how people think about themselves and where their loyalties lies. As authors like
Anderson, (1991), Billig (1995; see also Calhoun, 1991) and Brubaker (1996) have shown,
the creation and maintenance of national sentiments and of the very idea of a national
community depend upon the existence of nationalist practices which frame our everyday
life, and through which people of the same nation can imagine themselves as sharing the
same experiences and information. Yet, with the advent of globalization—or so it is
argued—, nationalist practices are becoming rarer whilst ‘global’ ones are becoming more
frequent (e.g. Fraser, 2007; Hannerz, 1996). To take but a couple of examples, nowadays
people are exposed to and can access information about what is happening outside as much
as within their nation, so that the feeling of sharing similar information with others may no
longer be concomitant with the limits of the nation. Also, the increased ease with which we
can travel around the world and communicate with anyone regardless of their localization
means that social networks of acquaintances and friendships do not have to be limited by
geographical factors as they used to be, and can easily cross over national boundaries. The
argued consequence of changes such as these is that people see themselves increasingly as
part of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘global’ community instead of national ones (e.g. Gergen,
1991). Thus, whilst legal citizenship remains nationality-based, people’s psychological
sense of citizenship could very well be underpinned by an identiﬁcation with and
commitment to the global, rather than national, community.
However, serious questions can be raised as regards the solidity of this narrative. To
begin with, one could question whether so-called ‘global’ practices really transcend the
nationality-based system of categorization. That is, does the fact that they are characterized
by an international dimension (in the sense that more than one nation is involved)
necessarily make them truly transnational (in the sense that nationality is irrelevant, e.g. see
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Conway & Singh, 2009)? For instance, newspapers may perhaps contain more inter-
national information than they did in the past, but as long as this information is categorized
as national versus international, the system of national categories remains. Likewise, whilst
one can easily order goods on the Internet from various countries in the world, posting
charges will soon be a reminder that which nation one is residing in still matters.
Furthermore, where explicit national markers are missing from practices, there is the
question of whether this reﬂects a true nationality-blind cosmopolitanism or whether it is
the expression of taken-for granted, banal nationalism and/or of hegemonic nationalism or
cultural imperialism (Smith, 1998; Tomlinson, 1991; Young, 2003). The most obvious
example is the way American products or practices are often taken for granted as global—
thus American movie stars are just ‘stars’ and there is no ‘google.co.us’ but only
‘google.com’. More generally, whilst in theory a global community is supposed to be
imagined as all-inclusive, in practice one must consider the possibility that it may lend
itself to ethnocentric projections (e.g. cf. Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, &Weber, 2003),
whereby such global community is imagined as the national community writ large, sharing
its same essential characteristics.
All of this therefore raises the question of whether globalization has indeed led to the
‘fragmentation’ of national identities and to a concomitant rise in cosmopolitan or global
identity as much as it has been claimed. And indeed, empirically speaking, data from large-
scale social surveys do not seem to strongly support that scenario. Thus, on the one hand,
there is little indication that national identities have been declining in any signiﬁcant way in
the last decades (e.g. Antonsich, 2009; Heath & Roberts, 2008; Rose, 1985; Sindic, 2008;
Smith & Jakko, 1998). For instance, the Eurobarometer data shows that across European
countries (and with the only exception of Germany), only a minority of 2 to 15% of the
population currently reject all sense of national pride (data from 2005), and that such pride
has in fact increased in most countries (with the exception of Spain and Northern Ireland)
from 1982 to 2005 (Antonsich, 2009). What is more, as already hinted to above, one could
also debate the meaning of such rejection: Does it reﬂect a real disengagement with
national identity (Fenton, 2007), or does it reﬂect, at least in part, a distancing from some of
the negative connotations associated with the idea of ‘national pride’ and/or ideological
norms against the open expression of national identity (Condor, 2000; Billig, 1992)2?
Whatever that may be, national identities remain a strong focus of people’s loyalties, and,
for the better or the worse, are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future (Sears, Davies,
& Reid, 2008; Sindic, 2008).
By contrast, the evidence in favour of a continuous rise in global or cosmopolitan
identity is so far mitigated at best—especially if the claim is that such identity is replacing
and transcending national identities instead of complementing or growing out of them.
Thus, for instance, whilst Norris (2000) argues, on the basis of the World Values Survey,
that the proportion of people seeing themselves as ‘cosmopolitan citizens of the globe’ has
signiﬁcantly increased amongst those born after the second world war compared to those
born before (rising from about 1/10th to about 1/5th of the population), the very data she
relies on also shows little if any signiﬁcant difference amongst the different cohorts born
after thewar. One could therefore question whether such ﬁnding is necessarily predictive of
a trend towards further increase as opposed to the result of a one-off historical event. What
is more, her deﬁnition and operationalization of the concept of ‘cosmopolitan citizens of
2In that respect, the exception of Germany may be signiﬁcant given the history of the word ‘nationalism’ in that
country.
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the globe’ is of those ‘identifying with their continent or theworld’ (p. 175), thus conﬂating
two things (and two ﬁgures) that may not be the same (in particular in Europe, where a the
existence of the EU means that an European identity might arguably differ from a global
one), as well as assuming that such territorial identiﬁcation necessarily means seeing
oneself as a citizen of the globe. Whatever that may be, even if we accept Norris’ generous
verdict, in absolute terms a cosmopolitan identity is still far from deﬁning the majority of
people (at best 1/5th of the younger generations) as well as far from competing in strength
with the proportion of people who, according to the same data, see nationality as their
primary territorial identity.
In sum, the above data seems to support Smith (1998)’s conclusion that ‘To date, we
cannot discern a serious rival to the nation for the affections and loyalties of most human
beings’ (p. 195). What is more, if the strength and pervasiveness of national identities have
so far not been affected by globalization as profoundly as some have argued, nor has it lead
them to be replaced en masse by a global or cosmopolitan identity, then there is good
reason to be at least sceptical as to the claim that this is going to radically change in the near
future (but see Passini & Morselli, 2011).
Of course, to answer more fully the question that concerns us here, it would remain to
be investigated in more detail how exactly national and/or other forms of identiﬁcation
relate to subjective feelings of citizenship. If one can question Norris’s assumption
that identifying with one’s continent and/or the world necessarily entails seeing oneself as
a cosmopolitan citizen, the very same question could be raised about the relationship
between identifying with one’s nation and seeing oneself as a national citizen. Never-
theless, this does not alter the fact that, currently, whilst a nationality-based model of
citizenship can potentially rely on a strong social psychological reality which is the
pervasiveness of national identities, the same can hardly be said for the ideal of a global
citizenship. That is, it remains to be shown that a global or cosmopolitan identity, on
which such global citizenship is supposed to rely, is so far more than an utopian ideal (or
an expression of hegemonic nationalism) and that it constitutes an actual social and
psychological reality for the majority of citizens, as opposed to an elite minority.
CONCLUSION
The goal of this special issue was to explore the ways in which psychology may help to
improve our understanding of citizenship. In line with this goal, I have focused here on
pointing out how the investigation of identity issues, and of national identity in particular, is
not only useful but necessary if we are to bring some light on the social psychological
dimensions of citizenship. More speciﬁcally, I argued that (a) psychological citizenship has
to be rooted in a sense of identity—albeit one that does not necessarily equate with
perceived similarity or homogeneity, and (b) that it is difﬁcult to see what, nowadays, and
for the great majority of people, are the credible alternatives to such identiﬁcation lying
primarily with the national community. Whilst it is important not to reify the relationship
between psychological citizenship and national identity as a natural necessity, the latter
seems to be currently the only form of identiﬁcation that is both psychologically consonant
with the notion of citizenship and a pervasive social psychological reality.
Of course, my argument has been no more than a rough sketch suggesting some avenues
of investigation that would need to be further explored. The overall message is that, whilst
the study of the social psychological correlates of citizenship is important, and that
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(national) identity should ﬁgure in key place amongst them, such work nevertheless
remains mostly to be done, as direct applications of social psychological theories of
identity to the issue of citizenship are still sparse. Yet, such work is all the more important
given the fact that debates by political theorists on the merits of various institutional and
legal models of citizenship always rely, implicitly or explicitly, on social psychological
assumptions (i.e. what are the psychological effects or conditions of citizenship practices
and institutions), but rarely address directly, as Norris (2000) points out, the question of
whether such assumptions can actually be grounded into empirical reality.
In making these points, I have purposefully avoided referring to the debates between
different theories and approaches within social psychology that deal with the issue of
identity—in particular the debates between ‘traditional’ approaches such as Social Identity
Theory and more ‘critical’ approaches such as discursive or rhetorical psychology—and
what their different contributions to the study of citizenship might be—as this would have
led us too far astray. However, such issues are never very far from the surface and inevitably
informed my argument. It may therefore be helpful to conclude with a quick (and more
explicit) word on this subject.
Two short points can be made: One about identity in general, and one about national
identity in particular. To start with the latter, I have explored brieﬂy the way in which the
speciﬁcity of the national imagination may be important to consider in a world where
citizenship is deﬁned by nationality. In that respect, it is clear that a theory like Social
Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981), however, useful it might be in
drawing our attention to generic identity processes, is limited precisely because of its
generic focus (Billig, 1996). For SIT, different social identities may provide different
contents (meanings, norms and values), but they are otherwise formally interchangeable.
There is no notion that different types of identities may be linked with different ways of
imagining what being a community and having an identity in themselves mean and entail.
The second point relates to the argument that identity and self-conceptions can
sometimes operate in ways that are not always explicitly acknowledged by social actors.
Again, this points to the limits of the research carried out within the framework of SIT,
given that such research typically relies on scales on which people have to report their
explicit degree of identiﬁcation—and given that the issue is not merely one of variation in
the contextual salience of identity (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). This is not
to say that such scales are not useful. Clearly, there are lot of situations in which people
claim explicit identiﬁcation with (or even pride in) their nationality, and clearly this has
important psychological implications. The point is simply that one should also be aware of
the limits of these scales, i.e. that what they measure do not exhaust the scope of the
psychological processes of identity.
In that framework, and as the above ‘lesson in geography’ has illustrated, discursive or
rhetorical approaches to social psychology can prove useful insofar as they are well-
equipped to analyse the taken-for-granted meanings and assumptions in language that
betray the implicit workings of identity (e.g. Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998)—such as for
instance the use of ‘deictic’ expressions (words like ‘us’, ‘our’, ‘here’, ‘this’ country, etc.,
see Billig, 1995; Condor, in press). However, not only such approaches cannot replace the
necessity of quantitative data when it comes to make large-scale claims as to the spread and
strength of identities amongst populations, but there is nothing to say that the very issue of
implicit identiﬁcation is by deﬁnition closed to more quantitative approaches. In the past
two decades or so, quantitative social psychologists have shown immense creativity in
developing new ways to measure implicit forms of racism and prejudice. There is no a
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priori reason why such creativity could not also be applied here. This is not just a question
of developing new, perhaps ‘automatic’ measures of identiﬁcation whereby people are
unable to consciously control their answers. It is also a question of thinking about the
situations in which implicit identiﬁcation can be indirectly revealed through its effects—
when and where, for instance, identity is denied, contested or threatened, and so that its
impact comes to the foreground.
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